Anti-Zionism in the second Intifada

The Arab leaders commend the response of the Arab masses, from the Atlantic Ocean to the Arabian Gulf, to the Intifadah of the valiant Palestinian people, and they acclaim the evident national consensus they have reached in standing together to condemn the Israeli aggression and the savage actions taken by the occupation forces. The stirring of the Arab masses is an expression of latent patriotic sentiments and of strong solidarity with the struggle of the Palestinian people for its sovereignty, its dignity and those things it holds sacred. ( Extraordinary Arab Summit, 2000) 

The leaders hail with great pride the Palestinian people's steadfastness and brave intifadah in the face of the savage onslaught waged by Israel and the brutal oppression exercised by the occupation authorities. They salute the brave martyrs of the intifadah and praise the spirit of sacrifice and steadfastness shown by the Palestinian people. The Palestinian people have managed through their national leadership, relentless determination, and limitless sacrifice, to confront Israel's repressive measures and abort the de facto policy, through which the occupation authorities have tried to impose their unfair terms on the Palestinian people and negotiator by force. The leaders declare that they stand by the Palestinian people in their heroic struggle and support their brave intifadah and legitimate right to resist occupation until they achieve their just national demands, represented by their right to return, self-determination, and the establishment of an independent Palestinian state with Jerusalem as its capital. (Arab Emergency Summit, 2001)

Abbas: "If we were to sum up where we have ended up after four years of the Intifada, [we would find that] there are three opinions: the first opinion is that after the killing of 1,000 Israelis in the Intifada, Israel would collapse, as would Sharon; the second opinion is that the armed Intifada would liberate the homeland; the third opinion is that the Intifada would bring the settlements to a halt. An examination [of the matter] shows that Sharon did not fall. On the contrary, he has become the most popular [leader] in the history of Israel, after having been subjected to condemnations in Israel. On the same note, all of the Palestinian lands are now occupied and vulnerable, and the settlements have nearly doubled. We damaged our relations with the Americans and with Israeli public opinion; the latest statement from the Quartet is an additional indication of what has become of us."

...

"The fourth opinion says: stop the 'militarization' of the Intifada. Let us fulfill our obligations as they appear in the Road Map and in the Basic Law, and let us convince the world that we have fulfilled our obligations and that Sharon must fulfill his... (Al Rai,  (Jordan), September 27, 2004. Translated by MEMRI)

Later that year, he also said, in an interview with As Sharq al Awsat:

"The uprising is a legitimate right of the people to express their rejection of the occupation by popular and social means," Mr Abbas said. "Using the weapons was harmful and has got to stop." (Guardian, December 15, 2004)

Mohammed Dahlan made similar statements in an interview with Al Hayat (London) in 2008:

Al-Hayat: "Do you think that the military operations inside the 1948 borders were a mistake?"

Dahlan: "Yes, they united the international community and the Israeli public against us. It would have been better to confine our operations to the territories occupied in 1967 and to military [targets]."

Al-Hayat: "So the operations in restaurants and against [other] civilian targets [were a mistake]?"

Dahlan: "A military operation is beneficial if it yields political profit. An operation is clearly a mistake if its outcome is political disaster..." (Al-Hayat (London), August 30, 2008 Memri Translation)

Neither Dahlan nor Abbas considered that blowing up civilians in a restaurant on purpose might not be a "military operation" in the sense that such are usually conceived in Western societies, or that it might be wrong to undertake such operations. No Palestinian spokesperson has considered the disastrous effect of the fact that the Palestinian authority had broken its word, not as a moral issue, but as a demonstration of the claim of the Israeli right that agreements made by the Palestinians would not be kept.

Security Fence and the Second Intifada

In June of 2002, following numerous terror attacks, the Israeli cabinet decided to build a "security fence" separating most of the West Bank from Israel and those settlements that Israel clearly intends to keep in any peace agreement.

The fence was originally a project of the Israel Labor party. Right wing parties objected to it because it would, in effect, be interpreted as a West Bank border. Unceasing suicide attacks, as well as car theft, theft of agricultural equipment and animals and vandalism increased the pressure for some sort of barrier to control passage of Arabs from the occupied territories into pre-1967 Israel. As a compromise, the right adopted the fence, but moved its route to include portions of the West Bank territories within Israel. This evoked opposition from the Israeli left as well as from Palestinians who complained both of de facto annexation of territory and of hardships imposed on Palestinian Arabs caught between the fence and Green Line 1967 Israel and unable to plow their fields on the other side of the fence, or in some cases, unable to go out their front doors. Anti-Israel activists call the fence the "Separation Barrier" or the "Apartheid Wall" or the "Separation Wall," though it is a concrete wall in only a small percent of its length. It includes about 8% of the territory of the West Bank. The International Court ruled that the fence is illegal, but the Israeli Supreme Court upheld its legality.

Both sides are right. There is little doubt that the fence has prevented terror attacks, and there is also little doubt that it has caused hardship to Palestinians and that in part, its route is determined by Israeli desire to retain West Bank territories.

Casualty figures and the progression of the Intifada

About four or five times as many Palestinian Arabs as Israelis have been killed in the course of the Intifada. Not including the Palestinians killed in internecine violence, this amounts to slightly less than 5,000 Palestinians and about 1,100 Israelis according to Betselem estimates. Other estimates tend to inflate Palestinian deaths with reported or alleged deaths, often caused in traffic accidents unrelated to the Intifada, and with deaths supposedly due to Palestinians who were not given health care in time due to closure. One such dead person was "resurrected" after he admitted faking a report of his death. Many of the reported Palestinian deaths were militants actively engaged in attacking Israeli civilians or suicide bombers who blew themselves up. At least some of the Israeli deaths were defense forces personnel engaged in incursions in the West Bank and Gaza. Each side will claim that their own casualties were "acting in self defense" or exercising "legitimate resistance." Palestinians often "justify" Israeli civilian casualties in the West Bank on the grounds that it is "legitimate" to kill settlers (often dehumanized as "male Jewish settlers" and "female Jewish settlers"). "Legitimate resistance" to occupation should not include indiscriminate killing of civilians. This is certainly stretching the point when the "occupying forces" or "settler" victim is a baby or a 4 year old child.

Israelis claim that relatively high proportions of Palestinian noncombatant casualties, including about 1000 Palestinian "children" killed, are due to the fact that terrorists use non-combatants cynically or locate terrorist bases in populated areas. In Gaza, however, there are few places that are not heavy populated.

In general, one goal of terror groups is to cause the enemy to react disproportionately so as to arouse world public opinion. Israel certainly fell into this trap in the initial stages of the Intifada, when Palestinians sent large numbers of relatively young adolescents and children to participate in "non-violent" demonstrations that included stone throwing. IDF soldiers were not equipped for crowd control and reacted with rubber bullets or live fire, killing many of the youthful "demonstrators." Israeli authorities did not seem to learn the lesson from many repetitions of such engagements in the first year or so of the Second Intifada. 

Beginning in 2003, Israeli casualties in the Second Intifada began to plummet. In 2002, 438 Israelis had been killed. In 2003, 201 Israelis were killed and in 2004 112. The security fence and information gathered in Operation Defensive Wall (or "Defensive Shield") enabled Israel to prevent many attacks. However, Palestinian casualties remained high. In 2002,  1036 Palestinians were reported killed. In 2003, 590 Palestinians were killed, while in 2004, 829 Palestinians were killed due to IDF or Israeli civilian actions, while "only" 112 Israelis were killed.  In 2005 both Israeli and Palestinian casualties reached a "low" of 197 and 52 respectively. But in 2006, Israel killed 662 Palestinians against 29 Israeli deaths and in 2007, Israel killed 383 Palestinians and suffered only 13 fatalities. In 2008, incomplete data show 433 Palestinian fatalities vs 31 Israeli deaths.

Israel claims that these Palestinian casualties were due to ongoing security operations needed to stop terror attacks from being hatched.

Casualty figures must be examined in detail. While there is no doubt that Israel killed many civilians unjustifiably (Palestinians killed a higher proportion of noncombatants, but less children), many of the Palestinian minors killed were engaged in some sort of hostile activity. 14 year old children attempted attacks on settlements or were killed while attempting to throw Molotov cocktails at tanks, or transported explosives. Israeli fatalities are low in part because of better protection of soldiers, care in isolating civilians from combat and the lack of success of Palestinian attacks. Grenades and molotov cocktails and mortars and rockets that do not hit anyone are not shown in the fatality statistics.

Qassam Rockets and Hamas - Following the Hamas takeover in Gaza, Palestinian casualties in Gaza soared, seemingly "for no reason." This was due both to Israeli determination to undermine the Hamas government, and to the urgent political need to stop the firing of thousands of Qassam rockets and mortars into Israel. While these did not cause many fatalities, they created an atmosphere of constant terror in Sderot and surrounding Negev towns, disrupting work and school routines. Classes were cancelled, students evacuated, families began to leave Sderot in droves. It was not possible to live with the constant rocket fire. Israel ultimately concluded a "lull" agreement with the Hamas because it had no choice. Once again, the enemy had been underestimated. Critics can say that the lull agreement could have been concluded much earlier, but it is not clear that this agreement will hold, and it is fairly certain that if hostilities are renewed, the Hamas will be in a far better position to inflict casualties, as it is utilizing the lull to import quantities of weapons.

While Israel can find justifications for the large numbers of Palestinian casualties, it did not take into account the radicalizing effect of continued killing, closures and other hardships, which have worked in favor of extremists. The attempt to oust Hamas by force from Gaza failed. The killings and often arbitrary behavior at checkpoints and during curfews are clearly counterproductive, yet Israel has not done very much to correct the problem or to take humanitarian concerns into account. Hard line Israeli spokespersons will note that in war, the object is to kill as many of the enemy as possible, while suffering as few as possible casualties of your own.

As long however, as the world views the Israeli occupation as the major cause of the conflict, it is evident that Israel cannot "win the war" simply by inflicting casualties and defeating the enemy militarily, and needless brutality works against Israel and against the cause of peace.

Collective Punishment and the Intifada

Collective punishment is illegal under international law. The laws were meant to prevent repetition of atrocities of World War I and World War II where German occupation forces would kill ten noncombatant civilians for every casualty inflicted on them. The term "collective punishment" has been used, probably inappropriately, against Israel to describe the effects of closures and the embargo of the Gaza strip. Security measures inevitably restrict the liberties and adversely affect every day lives of populations subject to those restrictions. But a country at war or an occupying power has an obligation to maintain security. The leaders of the Intifada certainly inflicted "collective punishment" on Israeli citizens, whether or not they are involved in, or responsible for the occupation in any way. 

Assassinations and the Second Intifada

A large number of Palestinian casualties are due to Israeli killing of Palestinian militants who were either implicated in multiple attacks, leaders of militant factions or in process of planning an attack. These "assassinations" also result, very often, in "collateral damage" casualties - fatalities and injuries to innocent bystanders.

The Israeli justifications for these policies is that there is no way to arrest these people (arrests of others often cause both Palestinian and IDF casualties) as they are heavily guarded. The Palestinian Authority 

Disengagement and the Second Intifada

The disengagement plan was originally conceived as evacuation of settlers from a limited part of the Gaza strip without withdrawal of the IDF. The implementation of the plan was quite different owing to US pressure and considerations of international law. The idea was to demonstrate to Palestinians and to the world that Israel was in earnest about peace, to reduce friction between Palestinian Arabs and Jewish settlers in the occupied territories and to free the best units of three IDF brigades that were engaged in defending the settlements.

The disengagement was not negotiated with the Palestinian Authority. At the time the disengagement was planned, Yasser Arafat was running the Palestinian Authority. Israelis believed from passed experience that negotiations with him would result only in increasing Arafat's legitimacy and extracting actual Israeli concessions in return for Palestinian concessions that would not be honored.

However, Israel believed that if it withdrew entirely from the Gaza strip it could no longer be accused of occupying Gaza. To this end, it went to great lengths to allow international control of the Rafah border crossing. The withdrawal of IDF troops was also no doubt due to American pressure.

However, the withdrawal from northern Gaza settlements gave the Palestinians a launching area for firing rockets and mortars into Israel. Because the disengagement was not due to an agreement with the Palestinian Authority, it weakened the Palestinian Authority and contributed to the rise of the Hamas. It is likely however, that the Palestinian polity would have fallen under the influence of Hamas after the death of Yasser Arafat in any case. 

The massive and obvious failure of the disengagement weakened the moderate cause in Israel and allowed the right-wing opponents of disengagement to point out that concessions to the Palestinians only lead to further violence and to substantiate their claim that a Palestinian state would be a base for extremists to attack Israel.

Role and Rise of Hamas in the Second Intifada

From the beginning of the Intifada it should have been obvious that the legitimation of open violence and extremism would lead to increasing influence of extremist groups,  particularly the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, which was under the control of Iran, and the Hamas, which came to be partly under the control of Iran and Syria during the Intifada. At the same time, given the program of groups like the Popular Resistance Committees and their splinter the Jayish al Islam, it seems that Intifada was at least partly powered by these groups from the start and was, from their point of view, designed as a vehicle that would bring them to power at the expense of the secular Fatah that had announced its agreement to a "historic compromise." Unbelievably, the Fatah helped to dig its own grave.

In his interviews with Al Hayat, Gaza Preventive Security chief Mohamed Dahlan stated:

Al-Hayat: "You said that every time Yasser Arafat left on a [diplomatic] visit, Hamas would prepare an operation. Who carried out the suicide operations in the Palestinian territories [at the time], Hamas or [Islamic] Jihad?"

Dahlan: "Hamas and [Islamic] Jihad [carried out the operations], but later they were joined by Fatah. [Fatah] is a liberal organization and not an extremist religious one, but it also carried out martyrdom operations during the Intifada. I do not want to assess the harm and benefit of these operations at the moment, but based on a general assessment of the years of Intifada, [I would say that] the harm outweighed the benefit, and the proof of this is our present situation. I judge things by their outcome."

Al-Hayat: "Who was responsible for the militarization of the Intifada?"

Dahlan: "We were all responsible. I clearly admit - it was a collective mistake..."  (Al-Hayat (London), August 30, 2008 Memri Translation)

Both statements are true. Examination of the record shows that the first suicide bombings were carried out by the Hamas and Islamic Jihad. The Fatah had no choice but to follow, because the glorification of "martyrdom" and legitimation of of violence which they themselves had initiated meant that only extremism could gain political legitimacy. Within the Palestinian polity, there could really be no contest. Fatah was both officially committed to peace with Israel and also practically bound to some extent by agreement with the US and EU and Israel, to which it had to at least pay lip service. Hamas and Islamic Jihad, which declared that their goal is elimination of all of Israel, were not bound in this way and would necessarily win any contest for extremism.

The rise of Hamas was also fueled by notorious Fatah corruption. While Palestinians are officially quick to defend the honor of "Abu Ammar" (Yasser Arafat), numerous Palestinian jokes attest to the corrupt state of the Palestinian authority, which was known as "Abu Ammar and the forty thieves. In one joke, Suha Arafat, Yassers' wife calls him at an important meeting of the Palestinian government and says:

"Dear Yasser, please come home. I think there are thieves in our house."

"Nonsense dear Suha, all the thieves are here with me."

Over a billion dollars are rumored or known to have gone into Swiss bank accounts and slush funds. Some of this money may have been used to purchase arms, but some was used to support Suha Arafat and others in luxury. European donations meant for Palestinian housing for the poor were diverted to luxury villas for Fatah bigwigs, each of whom notoriously drove a fancy Mercedes Benz automobile. The Palestinian Authority built hardly any hospitals and ran an inadequate school system. Hamas raised funds to fill these needs in part and bought popularity among the masses. Of course, the Hamas schools give students an Islamist extremist education.

Role of the United States - Prior to the 2006 elections, US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice insisted that Hamas be allowed to take part. This decision was forced over the objections of both Israel and Palestinian Authority President Abbas, and even though it contradicted provisions of the 2005 Oslo Interim Agreement which forbade the participation of candidates who espoused violence. Rice felt that the elections would not be "democratic." But the Hamas refused to recognize the legal basis of Palestinian Authority, which was formed in order to negotiate peace with Israel.

"Landslide" "Democratic" victory - Some claim that Hamas won a "landslide" "Democratic" victory in the Palestinian elections of 2006.  The Hamas victory in the 2006 elections was a narrow victory in the popular vote (Hamas had an advantage of 2-3% over Fatah). Neither party had a majority of the vote. Fatah, together with other secular parties had a majority of the vote. However, Hamas won a landslide victory in the seats given to Palestinian Legislative Council delegates because Fatah ran two or three "independent" candidates for almost every seat, dividing the Fatah vote among them, while Hamas ran only one "Change and Reform" party candidate.

When election results were announced, it was explained by apologists that Palestinians had voted for Hamas because they wanted good clean democratic government, but did not agree with Hamas policies regarding the peace process. That view seems to be borne out by poll after poll, which shows that Palestinians support the peace process and a two state solution as proposed by Fatah.  If that is the case, than the Hamas policies of non-recognition of Israel and refusal to honor agreements did not ever get a democratic mandate.

Hamas took power in Gaza in a bloody coup in June of 2007. Fatah supporters were executed by having their knees broken and then being thrown off buildings. In at least one case, a man was cut into "steaks" which were sent to his family. At the time, Hamas offered no explanation or justification for its actions. Later, Hamas and Hamas apologists claimed that the Fatah, aided by the United States and Hamas, had plotted a coup of their own. At the time, the head of Fatah forces in Gaza, Preventive Security Chief Dahlan, was in Germany being treated for knee problems. Fatah had not received any arms or training from the United States. No documentation or other proof has been offered to support the contention that a Fatah coup was planned, other than generalized statements by US officials of their intention to support the Fatah and urging Mahmoud Abbas to take a firm stance.

The 'Siege' of Gaza in the Second Intifada

When Hamas won the Palestinian elections, the quartet, including the EU, Russia, US and UN, instituted sanctions against the Hamas until and unless they would accept the Oslo peace process and the road map, agree to recognize the existence of Israel  and to renounce violence. These were basically the same conditions demanded by Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas. As long as the Hamas refused to accept these principles, an aid embargo was instituted against the Palestinian Authority and the Hamas. The embargo intensified when the Hamas coup usurped power in Gaza, since they took over the Rafah terminal and refused to allow the EU observers to do their work, on occasion attacking Israeli crossing points as well.

Despite obvious hardships that were created by the embargo and blockade, it is  apparent that there is no "genocide" or grave humanitarian crisis in Gaza. Photos of stores show that they are well stocked, presumably through the tunnels built under the Rafah crossing. Palestinian health officials in Gaza complained repeatedly that the Hamas had confiscated fuel intended for hospitals to use in running its vehicles. Photos of "candle light" vigils held to protest power cuts clearly show neon signs lighting the background. There is also no doubt that part or most of the reason that Israel has not taken more drastic steps is fear of criticism by world public opinion and fear of UN condemnation.

Israeli Military Victory in the Second Intifada

Israel has thus far achieved remarkable success in combating a guerrilla/terrorist uprising ("asymmetrical warfare") though such victories are supposed to be rare, and though the US and Iraqi government have not had similar success in Iraq. It should be pointed out that the struggle is not over, and may be renewed at any time by the Hamas in Gaza. Israeli success, such as it was, was due to several factors:

Superb intelligence, developed primarily after operation Defensive Shield, which allowed pinpointing the planners of attacks before they could be carried out. The intelligence substrate includes both information supplied by Defensive Shield and a network of collaborators.

Fence - Ability to fence off and isolate the Palestinian population, containing potential malefactors to Gaza and areas in the West Bank. The Security Fence and network of checkpoints which constitute harassment for Palestinians make it much easier to control the movement of arms and of malefactors. Numerous attacks were stopped by discoveries at checkpoints.

Presence in the area - The role of this factor was conclusively demonstrated by the withdrawal from Gaza. The Gaza security fence could prevent most attacks within Israel, but it could not prevent the firing of increasingly lethal rockets. Without a security presence within Gaza it was also impossible to prevent the Hamas coup. It is true that IDF could not prevent the firing of rockets and mortars when it occupied Gaza, but this was generally on a much smaller scale.

Willingness of troops and their officers to "get dirty" and engage the enemy, rather than staying cooped in to designated bases as US troops did in Iraq for a long time.

Undercover and covert operations units capable of being indistinguishable from Palestinian population.

Prospects for Negotiations during the Second Intifada

As long as the Hamas remains in power in Gaza and under the control of Syria and Iran, there cannot be real peace negotiations or a final settlement for numerous reasons, to be listed below. Nonetheless, the peace process and peace negotiations must, paradoxically continue, in order to provide a moderate alternative to the Hamas.

There cannot be peace while the Hamas remain in power or even are a major force in the Palestinian territories, at least not without Syrian and Iranian agreement because:

Hamas and Islamic Jihad are opposed to peace in principle. Even if they want to moderate their policy they could not do so without the approval of Iran and Syria, neither of whom are interested in furthering peace between Israel and the Palestinains, which is an American goal and does not serve their purposes.

Hamas and Islamic Jihad have demonstrated repeatedly that they can disrupt negotiations and torpedo any settlement by perpetrating terror attacks.

The Israeli public will not support the necessary serious concessions to the Palestinians as long as right wing extremists can convince the Israeli public that there is a serious and demonstrable threat that a Palestinian state will be a terrorist state controlled by the Hamas and other extremists.

The Palestinian leadership cannot make the necessary serious concessions to Israel as long as Hamas and Islamic Jihad perpetuate the culture of martyrdom and extremism and insist that any concessions are betrayal of the Palestinian cause.

The Second Intifada and the final settlement

In theory, the shape of the final settlement that would create a Palestinian state is known, and it would follow approximately the Geneva Accord or The Clinton Bridging Proposals, at least according to US officials and Israeli moderates. In practice, this solution is not politically achievable, and the Second Intifada made it more difficult to achieve. Israelis may have been willing to support a "shared Jerusalem" or divided Jerusalem before the outbreak of the violence. However, the violence, which broke out in Jerusalem, provided the Israeli right with tangible support for its claims about the security risks of dividing Jerusalem, and destroyed the political base of the Israeli peace movement. About 55% of Israelis, as of this writing, oppose any negotiations over Jerusalem. Without an agreement over Jerusalem, peace is impossible. At the same time, the Palestinian authority consistently supported maximalist claims regarding the return of Palestinian refugees and Jerusalem. Israelis will not agree to return of more than a symbolic number of refugees, or to elimination of all Israeli rights in the old city of Jerusalem. Massive return of refugees would mean the end of Jewish self-determination, and that is the intent of the demand for return of refugees. By stressing these issues and the "Palestinian State with its capital in Jerusalem" repeatedly, both before and during the Intifada, the Palestinian leadership made it increasingly difficult for their own negotiators to find a politically viable compromise. The Second Intifada also made it difficult for Palestinians to accept the same solution that they had rejected before the Intifada had imposed so much sacrifice on them.

On the other hand, the violence of the Second Intifada produced two somewhat positive effects. There is a growing "lobby" against further violence within the Palestinian population. In Israel, there is growing alienation between the majority of the polity and the settler lobby. While Israelis see the establishment of a Palestinian state as a security problem, and are afraid that concessions will embolden extremists, they are no longer enamored of "greater Israel" and they become increasingly revolted by the minority of settlers who attack both the government and the IDF, as these carry out policies of eliminating illegal outposts.