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Arabic: "بحيرة النجاح" وأنابوليس: إتمام الدائرة؟

Hebrew: ìéé÷-ñà÷ññ åàðàôåìéñ – ñåâøéí îòâì?

Annapolis versus Lake Success

As matters stand, the Annapolis conference may be defined as "failure Bay." What was significant was that in the aftermath of the conference, nothing positive has happened on either side. The only forces gathering momentum are Qassam rockets and Israeli settlements. At Lake Success, the United Nations decided to partition Palestine into a Jewish State and an Arab state, as envisioned in UN General Assembly Resolution 181. 60 years later, in Annapolis, it was still not possible to get Arab support for the recognition of a Jewish state. In other respects, the refusal to intervene on the ground and the growing violence are indeed ominously reminiscent of 1947.

"Lake Success" and Annapolis: Completing the circle?

Paul Scham

WASHINGTON—November 29, 2007 marked the 60th anniversary of the United Nations vote to partition the British mandate of Palestine into two states, Jewish and Arab. Jews called it "The Miracle of Lake Success" (the location of UN headquarters at the time) while Arabs called it illegal and a betrayal of Palestine's Arab inhabitants.

The anniversary coincided with the Annapolis meeting that has restarted Israeli and Palestinian peace negotiations after seven bleak and violent years. Though presumably unintentional, the coincidence highlights the long history of seemingly indispensable international efforts to settle the conflict. Unknown at this point is whether Annapolis represents a new beginning or simply a political show.

Looking at the international framework gives cause for hope. In 1947, the Arab countries were vociferously and unanimously against partition, and for decades maintained their steadfast opposition to Israel's existence. This year, in contrast, most of the Arab countries attended Annapolis, demonstrating desire for peace. They all approved the Arab League Initiative, adopted in 2002, and reconfirmed in 2007, which promises a consensual resolution of the issue of Palestinian refugees and peace and normalization with Israel in return for Israeli withdrawal to the boundaries of 1967—boundaries establishing a considerably larger Israel than those the Arabs previously rejected in 1947.

The biggest stumbling block ahead continues to be the suspicion built up over six decades of violence. Palestinians are convinced that Israelis have no intention of terminating their presence in the West Bank and Gaza, and ending Israeli control of Palestinian lives and land. Palestinians insist they will not make peace without East Jerusalem as their capital, an issue that arouses deep-seated religious emotions on all sides.

Israelis find it very difficult to forget the day after their declared independence in 1948 when five Arab countries sent troops into Palestine/Israel. Although Israel managed to defeat them easily, the fear of annihilation lingers. These fears are further buttressed by memories of the 1967 war, when even larger forces were arrayed against them. Suicide bombers, although far less common than a few years ago, continue to convince Israelis that Palestinians are still bent on their annihilation. Israelis want guarantees of security, perhaps beyond the capacity of anyone to provide.

Above all, Israelis and Palestinians need mutual recognition and affirmed legitimacy. Israelis are convinced that the Arab world, even if it promises peace, does not really accept a Jewish state in its midst. Even though 70% of Israelis tell pollsters that they would accept a Palestinian state, polls show that Palestinians cannot imagine Israel ever giving up control of Palestinian lives. In a symmetry that would be amusing were it not tragic, polls show that Palestinians possess a similar willingness to accept the other side, but cannot believe they themselves would be accepted. Both sides are convinced that they are the victims, that it would be so easy for the "other" side to grant what they feel they need, and that the compromises they are asked to make are unendurable given what they have suffered.

Many took from the failure of the Oslo Process an experience that good intentions were defeated and betrayed by the other side. That historical "memory" is a major obstacle to peace within both societies.

However, history can also provide another, more optimistic, perspective. It is worth recalling that it would have been unimaginable in 1947 for a Palestinian and an Israeli leader to repeatedly proclaim their joint desire for peace.

Unlike 1947, or even 1993, when the Oslo Declaration of Principles was signed, the pieces for sustainable peace are on the table, just waiting for the statesmen to assemble them into a viable framework: a Palestinian state within the 1967 boundaries and a sharing of Jerusalem; 1:1 land swaps for settlement territories; security for Israelis guaranteed by working Palestinian civil and military institutions; and resettlement of refugees in a Palestinian state or elsewhere with some compensation. These are the most likely contours of peace. As the saying goes, it's not rocket science.

What Annapolis made noteworthy, in vivid contrast to past efforts, is that the current Palestinian and Israeli leaders are not only willing to go further for peace than any of their predecessors, but have staked their political futures on it. In addition, the leadership of the Arab world and even much of the Muslim world has weighed in on the side of a consensual settlement. This is unprecedented, and should be recognized as such.

With most of the world's leadership now actively supporting peace, the peace forces within the two societies now face a major challenge: to re-ignite the people's faith that a two-state solution can result from the Annapolis process within the next year, not in an undefined future. Extending help to these civil society forces must, consequently, be a major focus at the donors' conference scheduled next Monday, December 17th.


* Paul Scham is an Adjunct Scholar at the Middle East Institute and formerly a Research Associate at the Truman Institute for Peace of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem; co-editor of the book Shared Histories: A Palestinian-Israeli Dialogue. This article was written for the Common Ground News Service.

Source: The Common Ground News Service (CGNews), 13 December 2007, www.commongroundnews.com.

Copyright permission has been obtained for publication.

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