Final Curtain?
Ami Isseroff
September 8, 2003
With the resignation of Palestinian PM Mahmud Abbas amidst Palestinian suicide bombings and Israeli assassinations, many are asking if the final curtain has fallen on the US roadmap for peace.
"Final curtain" is an apt metaphor. Soon after the roadmap got under way, it became apparent that we are witnessing a vast theater performance rather than a real-world diplomatic process. The Israelis and Palestinians were performing for the Europeans and Americans. The Americans were performing for the Arab and Muslim countries, as compensation for the invasion of Iraq, and everyone was performing for their own home audiences. Those who really want to be fooled might pretend that the performance is the real thing, but facts show otherwise.
Externally, the Palestinians, as always, want to escalate the crisis in order to involve either Arab countries or the UN. This has been Palestinian policy since 1948. It was the purpose of the violence that began in September 2000, and it remains a strategic goal. They apparently calculate that this is the best chance they have of combating Israel, whether it is through an "international force" or armed intervention by Arab states. Internally, rival guerilla groups thrive on the struggle, and gain supporters according to the virulence of their rhetoric and acts against Israel. If the struggle ends it will put them out of business.
The Sharon government for its part, wants to create a situation, perhaps a general war, that would justify liquidation of the Palestinian Authority, which is a legacy of the failed Oslo accords Perhaps such a situation would also encourage many Palestinians to emigrate from Gaza and the West Bank. The remainder of the Palestinians might be closed off in a few small enclaves, and Israel could continue to hold, or perhaps even officially annex, the lands of the West Bank that are so necessary because of their water resources and because they offer cheap real estate close to the heart of Israel.
Neither party had any interest in implementing the roadmap. But the Americans and Europeans demanded adherence to the roadmap, and the sides had to make a show of compliance in order to win both foreign aid and diplomatic support.
The roadmap requires that Israel end its punitive acts against Palestinians and withdraw from the areas reoccupied after September 2000. The Israelis pretended to implement humanitarian concessions. A tiny fraction of the thousands of prisoners held for infractions such as throwing racks was released after painful negotiations, and with much fanfare. A few permanent roadblocks were removed with great ceremony, and replaced with mobile roadblocks. Tanks withdrew a few hundred meters and towns were surrounded rather than occupied. Palestinians were permitted to work in Israel. But in fact, very little changed in the daily life of Palestinians. Bloody Israeli incursions and assassinations as well as curfews, belied the photo-ops and media reports of "progress" toward peace. Israeli policy eradicated whatever small chance Mahmud Abbas may have had of enforcing the will of his faction over that of the Fatah activists led by Arafat and the Islamic extremists.
The roadmap also requires that the Palestinian authority take active steps to disarm terrorist groups and control violence. Instead, Mahmud Abbas negotiated a shaky Hudna (truce) agreement with extremist groups, an agreement that was broken from the start by all the groups including the Al-Aqsa martyrs of Abbas's own Fatah. All the groups carried out terror attacks even while claiming they would honor the Hudna. Under the cover of the Hudna, the Hamas built improved Kassam rockets and imported arms, while Abbas security appointee Mohamed Dahlan looked on and did nothing.
The Americans concluded that Abbas was too weak to deliver the goods, the "goods" being establishment of a responsible central government that would eliminate terror and live up to its agreements. Receiving him with great fanfare, the Bush administration refused to back any of his demands. The Palestinians had calculated that prisoner release was a good issue. The Israelis could release many of the prisoners held for minor violations such as throwing rocks, or held under administrative arrest with no charges at all against them, without any real security risk. They raised up the prisoner release as an important issue, organizing rallies and giving it publicity until it overshadowed closure, incursions and all other Palestinian problems, in order to show an impressive gain when the Israelis consented to the prisoner release. The Israelis, however, were willing to free only about some of the prisoners prisoners in small batches. When the US rebuffed Abbas's request for support on this issue too, Abbas, who had come to power because of US support, must've realized that his time was nearing its end. The US had decided he was not viable.
It is absurd, however, for the Palestinians to blame Ariel Sharon for the failure of the roadmap and of Abbas's government, because, of course, Ariel Sharon and his government have no interest in the success of the roadmap or of Abbas's government. You cannot blame a tiger for eating meat. There was no reason to expect real Israeli support for Abbas, any more than one might expect Abbas to support Sharon. Sharon needs a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza like he needs a hole in the head. Abbas might have been nominally useful to Sharon if he had agreed to a rump-Palestinian state on 60% of the territory of the West Bank and Gaza, and had made order in Palestine, but that was not the case.
Abbas announced that he wanted nothing less than full Israeli withdrawal to 1967 lines. Worse, he would not give up on Right of Return for Palestinian refugees - the "right" to flood Israel with millions of Palestinian Arabs. He also announced that he would only negotiate with the Hamas, Islamic Jihad and extremist wings of the Fatah. He was not willing or able to make order even within his own Fatah.
If Abbas would've succeeded in ending the violence and presenting a strong Palestinian case, he would've been far more dangerous to Israel than Yasser Arafat, already marked by Israel and the USA as an obstacle to peace, because of his role in instigating and perpetuating the violence. However, the Israelis supported Abbas and the roadmap because they calculated that Abbas would never be able to get Palestinian society under control. An Israeli source explained to me that "the beauty of the roadmap is that they can never comply." The Palestinians fell into the trap. They willingly complied with the non-compliance assessment.
If Abbas had tried to impose order and failed, the failure might be blamed on the Israelis. The Palestinian security forces were no doubt greatly weakened by the Israeli incursions. Nonetheless, the Fatah must be stronger than its own tiny Al-Aqsa brigades faction, and in Gaza the security police greatly outnumber and outclass the Hamas and Islamic Jihad fighters, But Abbas did not even try to make order. Abbas had the illusion that somehow he could control these groups without force. This policy had no chance of success, because stronger rival Fatah factions, including Yasser Arafat, as well as the Islamic groups, were opposed to his leadership and wanted to ensure his failure and that of the roadmap, and they were ably assisted by the Israeli government.
It remains to be seen if the roadmap play is over, or if it is to be a tragedy in several acts. Meanwhile, there is no sign that either Palestinians or Israelis want to change the basic script.
To ensure that everyone understands, on the day of Abbas's resignation, Israel made a failed attempt on the life of Hamas leader Sheikh Ahmed Yassin. Yassin is a racist who heads a racist reactionary organization that decrees that killing Jews is a religious obligation, and that the "Zionists" are responsible for all the ills of the world including the terrible French revolution. After the attack on the World Trade Center, the Hamas newspaper gloated "Allah has granted our prayers." The world would not be a worse place without Ahmed Yassin. However, Yassin is an elderly cripple, who could have no role in detailed planning of any Hamas terror operations. Killing him would not prevent any bombings. It would only manufacture another "martyr." The attempt on Yassin could only have the goal of deliberately stirring up unrest and opposition to the roadmap.
The PNA has ceased to even pretend to function as a Palestinian government. It is not possible to expect that a government of guerilla bands will stop themselves from committing terrorist acts. The Palestinians have no government and no cohesive internal leadership. The collection of armed terror groups that forms the PLO is not a substitute for a civil polity. Without a government, they can't build a society, and they can't parry any Israeli moves except with random terror and ineffective posturing. The appointment of Ahmed Qureia ("Abu Ala") as PM to replace Mahmud Abbas was done in the old style: Fatah and PLO approved the decision of Yasser Arafat. The guerilla groups are in charge. Later, a show will be made of approval in the Palestine Legislative Council. Qureia has in the past announced that Palestinians should claim all of the area mandated by the UN partition plan of 1947 as well as right of return for Palestinian refugees, positions not likely to be conducive to a peace agreement with Israel. However, as neither side wants peace, it doesn't matter.
It doesn't matter either, if we have seen the final curtain fall on the roadmap, or if we are just enjoying the intermission. As long as neither side is committed to peace, the roadmap is just another show.
Ami Isseroff
Rehovot,
Israel
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